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SECTION 111(d) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: A NEW 
APPROACH TO THE CONTROL OF AIRBORNE 
CARCINOGENS 
Frank B. Cross* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large quantities of potentially cancer-causing substances are emit-
ted into the air daily. 1 While the precise degree of risk caused by 
these emissions is not known, the potential public health hazard 
clearly calls for an effective regulatory program to control such 
airborne carcinogens, at least in cirumstances where they pose a 
significant risk. 2 Unfortunately, no such effective program exists at 
the present time. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has federal regula-
tory authority over airborne carcinogens under the Clean Air Act,3 
and there is a widespread, virtually universal, recognition that the 
agency's current efforts have been a failure. 4 The EPA has initiated 
regulations for only a handful of the many suspected carcinogens in 
the ambient air, and has had only limited success in controlling the 
emissions of the few substances that it has addressed. 5 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, College and Graduate School of Business, the 
University of Texas at Austin; B.A. 1977, University of Kansas; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law 
School. 
1 Emissions of substances included on EPA's list of potential carcinogens range from the 
tens of thousands to the billions of tons. Hearing on the Clean Air Act (Part Two) Before the 
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 717 (1981) (table of emissions attached to the statement of David Doniger 
of the Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter cited as CAA Hearings]. 
Moreover, in the absence of regulation, chemical production and emissions of carcinogens 
have increased dramatically. See Hearing on Clean Air Act Oversight Before the Senate Comm. 
on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1981) (increases in excess of 
2000% over 25 year period) [hereinafter cited as CAA Oversight Hearings]. 
2 See infra notes 61-67. 
342 U.S.C. § 7401 (1978). 
4 See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text. 
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Many have correctly ascribed the agency's failure to its unbending 
reliance on the strict dictates of section 112 of the Clean Air Act,6 
which it now uses as the sole vehicle for regulating carcinogens in 
the air. Section 112 requires the agency to identify hazardous air 
pollutants and to set national emissions standards within a "margin 
of safety" that is solely defined by the projected health effects emis-
sions would have upon the public. Under a literal reading of the 
section, all emissions of carcinogens - which have no provable mar-
gin of safety - would be prohibited, resulting in forced shut-downs 
of industrial plants or even entire industries. The EPA has avoided 
such an absolutist reading of section 112. It has also, however, 
avoided regulating under section 112, in part to avert court chal-
lenges of its less-than-absolutist reading of the section. Therefore, 
the agency's actions initiated under section 112 have been few. While 
the recognized shortcomings of section 112 have prompted calls for 
statutory amendments from both environmentalists calling for more 
stringent regulation, and from industries calling for a more cost-
effective and efficient system of regulation, proposed revisions to 
date consistently have been stalled in the legislative process. The 
affected parties seem unable to agree on the nature of needed 
changes to the Act and have succeeded only in blocking each other's 
amendments, leaving the current situation unchanged, no matter 
how unacceptable it may seem. 
Both industry and the environmental groups are correct in their 
recognition of the need for change - but the objectives of both 
groups can be accomplished administratively, without relying on the 
difficult and unpredictable option of statutory change. Originally, the 
Clean Air Act provided for possible regulation of hazardous carcin-
ogens under section 111(d),7 a statutory option that survives the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, and offers the EPA a more 
flexible means of regulation than section 112. Unlike section 112, 
section 111(d) allows the agency to consider compliance costs in 
setting emissions standards; section 111(d) also differs from section 
112 because it is designed to treat localized health hazards, the type 
of health hazard most commonly associated with air toxics such as 
airborne carcinogens. Simply by returning to the design of the orig-
inal Clean Air Act for control of carcinogens, EPA can implement a 
program that has much greater promise for effective control of these 
hazardous air pollutants. The Act, as amended, makes clear that the 
642 u.s.c. § 7412 (1978). 
742 u.s.c. § 7411(d) (1978). 
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agency should consider authorities other than section 112 for regu-
lation of airborne carcinogens. Expanded reliance on these alterna-
tives, especially section l11(d), would promote greater public health 
protection as well as rules that are more likely to be acceptable to 
regulated companies. 
In accordance with Congress' intention that the EPA flexibly use 
available statutory tools, this article advocates that the agency 
should not rely exclusively upon section 112 to regulate airborne 
carcinogens. EPA should, in addition, use section 111(d). This article 
first explores the weaknesses of the EPA's current section 112-based 
system of regulation, detailing both the environmentalists' and the 
industry criticisms of that system, and the EPA's less than satisfac-
tory section 112 regulatory efforts. It next discusses section 111(d) 
as an alternative to section 112. The article further argues that both 
the structure of the Clean Air Act and its legislative history suggest 
that Congress intended that EPA use section l11(d) to regulate 
airborne carcinogens; that section 111(d) offers the EPA more flex-
ibility than section 112 because it allows consideration of compliance 
costs; and that, because it is designed to treat the type of localized 
health hazard most often posed by airborne carcinogens, section 
111(d) is a more suitable means of regulating airborne carcinogens 
than section 112. This article concludes that section 111(d) is an 
advantageous alternative to section 112 because it allows the EPA 
promptly to treat the health hazard posed by airborne carcinogens. 
Furthermore, it is preferable to the agency's current inaction pend-
ing Congress' amendment of the Clean Air Act. 
II. HISTORY OF EPA's FAILURE TO REGULATE AIRBORNE 
CARCINOGENS 
Since there is little doubt as to the failure of EPA to regulate 
airborne carcinogens, it is important to understand the approach 
EPA has used in past regulation efforts before calling for policy 
changes. 
Groups devoted to environmental protection repeatedly have crit-
icized EPA's performance in controlling emissions of hazardous air 
pollutants. The National Clean Air Council, a coalition of environ-
mental groups focusing on proposed Clean Air Act revisions, de-
scribed the current program as a "failure" and a "study in equivo-
cation."8 The Natural Resources Defense Council complained that 
8 CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 704. 
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EPA had "done very little" and that its existing program was "totally 
inadequate."9 The Attorney General of the State of New York, who 
testified in favor of strengthening the Clean Air Act, referred to the 
agency's "dismal record" in controlling toxic air pollutants. 10 
Industry representatives have been almost as critical as environ-
mental groups. The Chemical Manufacturers Association has de-
scribed EPA's policy on regulation of hazardous air pollutants as 
"simplistic," "inappropriate," and "counterproductive."11 The Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute found the current program created "need-
less confusion, controversy and delay. "12 Indeed, no one seems sat-
isfied with the current state of affairs. Then EPA Administrator 
Ruckelshaus noted that "EPA's efforts to date have been criticized 
by many, including some in industry, the states, environmentalists, 
and most recently the General Accounting Office, as being plagued 
by delay. "13 
EPA itself has been quite candid in acknowledging its "slowness" 
and "difficulties. "14 Ruckelshaus conceded that "EPA has had prob-
lems" in regulating hazardous air pollutants. 15 Walter Barber, Di-
rector of EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, noted 
that "only limited progress" had been made in carcinogen regula-
tion. 16 Barber himself has testified for statutory modifications to 
section 112.17 
Despite the almost unamimous recognition of the inadequacy of 
EPA's current program, little or nothing has been done to change 
the situation. The environmental and industry groups have proposed 
only statutory amendments, which have been unacceptable to one 
another and have never come close to congressional passage. A 
9 CAA Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 519 (testimony of David Doniger, Natural 
Resources Defense Council senior project attorney). 
10 Hearings on Health Standards for Air Pollutants Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 
(statement of Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of N ew York) [hereinafter cited 
as Health Standards Hearings]. 
11 CAA Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 700. 
12 Hearings on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Part 3) Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
601 (1984) (letter from Steven Swanson, Director, Health and Safety Regulation Department) 
[hereinafter cited as CAA Reauthorization Hearings]. 
13 Hearing on EPA's Air Pollution Control Program Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Air Pollution Control Program Hearings]. 
14 CAA Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 12, at 19. 
15 Id. 
16 CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 733. 
17 Id. 
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better approach would be to work within the existing Clean Air Act. 
The following analysis of the history of hazardous air pollutant reg-
ulation reveals the root cause of the agency's failure, and suggests 
administrative changes that can promote much more effective reg-
ulation of airborne carcinogens. 
A. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act 
Evaluating EPA's past controls on airborne carcinogens requires 
an understanding of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the sole sta-
tutory authority employed in regulations adopted to date. Intui-
tively, this section dealing with "hazardous air pollutants" seems the 
most logical regulatory vehicle. While it affords authority for regu-
lation of airborne carcinogens, its specific dictates may make its 
authority impractical. 
Section 112 provides for control of air pollutants "which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an 
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible ill-
ness. "18 Once such pollutants have been identified, the section calls 
upon the Administrator of EPA to develop "a list which includes 
each hazardous air pollutant for which he intends to establish an 
emission standard under this section. "19 
The Administrator's listing decision immediately triggers a brief 
timetable for adoption of emission standards (called National Emis-
sion Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants or "NESHAPS") for 
stationary sources of the pollutant. Within 180 days of the listing, 
EPA must publish "proposed regulations establishing emission stan-
dards for such pollutant . . . . "20 Then, no later than 180 days after 
such publication, EPA must promulgate final emission standards. 21 
These emission standards must be set "at the level which in [the 
EPA Administrator's] judgment provides an ample margin of safety 
to protect the public health from such hazardous air pollutant. "22 
Significantly, the section contains no mention of cost-benefit analysis 
or any other economic consideration in standard-setting. 
While there is relatively little legislative history on section 112, 
what exists suggests that the section was "tightly drawn" to cover 
18 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1976 and Supp. V 1981). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1976 and Supp. v 1981). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1976 and Supp. V 1981). 
21Id. 
22 Id. 
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the most hazardous air pollutants. 23 The Senate Report and Confer-
ence Report stress that NESHAPs were intended to apply to "a 
limited number of pollutants" that present an "imminent danger" to 
public health and safety.24 Senator Muskie, known as the father of 
the Clean Air Act, stated that Congress intended section 112 to 
grant EPA power to respond to "strong evidence" that "any level" 
of "certain pollutants" may cause effects of a magnitude that "could 
not be tolerated. "25 Throughout its legislative history, the types of 
substances properly subject to section 112 regulation are character-
ized as "extremely" or "highly" hazardous. 26 
EPA has used its section 112 authority to respond to airborne 
carcinogens, and, to be fair, its reliance on section 112 seems consis-
tent with congressional intent. 27 Other sections of the Clean Air Act 
do not explicitly address carcinogens emitted from stationary 
sources. Thus, section 112, which specifically addresses hazardous 
air pollutants from stationary sources, seems appropriate for carcin-
ogen regulation. 28 For two reasons, however, section 112 will often 
be ill-suited to carcinogen regulation. First, given the current state 
of scientific knowledge, there is no demonstrably safe level of human 
exposure to a carcinogen. 29 Hence, the statutory mandate of a "mar-
gin of safety" can only be achieved by a total prohibition on the 
production of carcinogens. 3o Second, such a total prohibition makes 
the agency avoid regulation. Many carcinogenic substances are vital 
23 See A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 377 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Leg. Hist.J. 
24 1970 Leg. Hist., supra note 23, at 420 (Senate Report) and 197 (Conference Report). 
25 [d. at 277. 
26 [d. at 116, 195, 241, 270, 328, 384, 971, 1097, 1364, 1365, 1367, and 1369. 
27 See infra notes 64-67. Airborne carcinogens are apparently responsible for numerous 
deaths, thereby clearly meeting the statutory definition of hazardous as an "increase in 
mortality. " 
28 Some potentially hazardous pollutants, such as lead and particulates, are regulated under 
sections 108-110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-10 (1976 and Supp. V 1981). See 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1985). 
29 See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 232 (former Ad-
ministrator Ruckelshaus) ("EPA has generally in the past concluded that in the absence of 
sound scientific evidence to the contrary, prudent public health policy requires that we assume 
no threshold of effect for carcinogens.") See also the United States Supreme Court's discussion 
of this issue in Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 
635-36 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
30 See Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 134 (Congressional 
Research Service) ("it is not physically possible, at this time, to manufacture, store or use 
potentially hazardous substanc.es without some release to the environment, however small."). 
If the only safe level is zero exposure, a production ban would be essential to reach that level 
and even then there would be no "margin of safety" between the standard and the lowest 
threshold of harm. 
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to the economy of the United States, making prohibition an unreal-
istic alternative. 31 Under a strict reading of the section, EPA might 
be required to close down much of the nation's industrial base. 32 The 
agency has not adopted such a strict reading, but, as the following 
discussion reveals, the fear that the courts may impose such an 
interpretation has made EPA reluctant to take any action on air-
borne carcinogens. 
B. EPA Regulation to Date 
As this section demonstrates, EPA's track record in controlling 
carcinogens under section 112 is one of extreme hesitance. The agen-
cy's first attempt to regulate an airborne carcinogen occurred in 
1971, shortly after passage of the Clean Air Act. EPA then sought 
to regulate asbestos, based on that substance's undisputed link to a 
relatively rare form of cancer known as asbestosis. 33 The agency 
proceeded under section 112 of the Act by listing asbestos as a 
hazardous air pollutant. Almost immediately, it ran into difficulties. 
Although the Clean Air Act permits only 180 days for promulgation 
of emission control regulations, EPA needed two years to do so, a 
period of time that would have been longer but for a court order 
requiring EPA to promulgate regulations. 34 The delay was largely 
due to the agency's hesitance to regulate in the face of the potentially 
severe economic consequences of controls. Under the language of 
section 112, the agency apparently had no authority to consider such 
consequences. 35 Eventually, EPA simply skirted the economic issue. 
The agency considered " ... banning production, processing, and use 
of asbestos," which would "result in the prohibition of many activities 
31 See Industrial Union Dept., 448 U.S. at 637 ("[b]ecause of benzene's importance to the 
economy, no one has ever suggested that it would be feasible to eliminate its use entirely. "). 
32 This problem arose even more clearly in EPA's regulation of airborne radionuclides under 
section 112. The agency noted that "probably every stack in the country discharges into air 
minute quantities of radionuclides which could be measured given enough resources. These 
emissions cause, in theory, some risk greater than zero." EPA, Radionuclides: Response to 
Comments for Final Rules 11 (October 1984) (EPA 520/1-84-023-1). Obviously, Congress did 
not intend for EPA to shut down every manufacturing operation in the nation to ensure the 
public faced zero risk from radionuclide emissions. 
33 36 Fed. Reg. 23,239 (1971). This same notice also included regulation of emission of 
beryllium and mercury, but for acute toxic, not carcinogenic, effects. 
34 Final standards were promulgated at 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1973), following the decision in 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 3 E.L.R. 20,173 (D.D.C. 1973), requiring the 
agency to act within sixty days. 
35 See Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and 
Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOL. L.Q. 500, 571-72 (1978). 
222 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:215 
which are extremely important,"36 but rejected this alternative as 
unnecessary.37 The agency thus circumvented a flat prohibition - a 
prohibition that a literal reading of section 112 required - by min-
imizing, and even underestimating, the health hazard asbestos 
posed. 
After the difficulties in setting asbestos emission standards, the 
agency waited two years before proposing its second standard for 
carcinogens, this time for vinyl chloride. 38 EPA had known of the 
carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride for over two years, but had hesitated 
to act, primarily out of fear of causing serious, adverse economic 
impacts. 39 Since vinyl chloride is a carcinogen, there can be no guar-
anteed safe level of exposure; thus total safety would require zero 
emissions. Again, the agency rejected a total ban, this time on the 
grounds that "Congress did not intend to impose the costs associ-
ated" with such a prohibition. 40 In effect, by implying a congressional 
intention not to impose prohibitive economic costs upon industry, 
the agency regulated in response to the economic effects of regula-
tion, thus considering the very factor that a literal reading of section 
112 did not authorize. Accordingly, the standard that the agency 
adopted reduced emissions only to the point where additional con-
trols would have costs "grossly disproportionate" to their emission 
reduction benefits.41 The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) im-
mediately sued EPA alleging that its standard was protective of 
industry.42 EPA and EDF settled the lawsuit in 1977; EPA agreed 
to revise the standard to meet EDF's goal of eliminating all emissions 
of vinyl chloride, without regard to cost.43 
Apparently in reaction to its difficulties with both asbestos and 
vinyl chloride, the agency took no further action on carcinogenic air 
pollutants for another two years. Even then, EPA did not regulate 
a hazardous substance pollutant, but simply proposed a generic pol-
icy for future regulation. 44 The agency reevaluated its historic posi-
36 38 Fed. Reg. at 8820 (1973). 
37 [d. 
38 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532 (1975). 
39 See Doniger, supra note 35, at 566 ("Hesitant either to flout the literal meaning of section 
112 or to set a standard effectively closing the VC, PVC, and related industries, EPA delayed 
setting any standard .... "). 
40 40 Fed. Reg. at 59,534 (1975). 
41 [d. 
42 Environmental Defense Fund v. Train, No. 76-2045 (D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 19, 1976; settled 
and dismissed, June 24, 1977). 
43 See Doniger, supra note 35, at 582. 
44 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642 (1979). 
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tion, in recognition of the fact that a "number of scientific, technical, 
and policy problems have arisen which complicate the regulation of 
airborne carcinogens under section 112. "45 EPA conceded that un-
certainty about factors such as the degree of control required, "com-
pounded by the language of section 112 itself," has led to 
"[s]ignificant delays in establishing standards."46 Thus, even at this 
date, EPA recognized the serious problems associated with proceed-
ing under section 112. 
EPA's proposed Airborne Carcinogen Policy of 197947 represented 
an attempt to resolve difficulties that regulation under section 112 
posed. Remarkably, although section 112 was central to the agency's 
prior difficulties, the new proposed Policy continued to rely on that 
section as the all-but-exclusive vehicle for regulating sources of air-
borne carcinogens. The Policy began by providing for the listing of 
the substances presenting a "significant carcinogenic risk" under 
section 112.48 Substances found to be "probable carcinogens" were 
also to be listed where there was "significant" human exposure. 49 
EPA optimistically anticipated that "a substantial number of sub-
stances" would qualify for listing and be regulated under these cri-
teria. 50 
After listing, the proposed Policy called upon EPA to identify and 
prioritize all categories of stationary sources ofthe listed substance. 51 
N ext followed the most significant section of the Policy, the section 
setting forth the degree of emission reduction to be required. Re-
jecting zero emissions as a goal, the Policy established "best available 
technology" (BAT) as a minimum level of control under section 112.52 
The BAT was defined as "that technology, which in the judgment of 
the Administrator, is the most advanced level of control adequately 
demonstrated, considering economic, energy, and environmental im-
pacts."53 Such controls are to reflect "the most advanced level of 
technology that at least most members of an industry could afford 
without plant closures," and without "preclud[ing] new construc-
tion."54 BAT was not necessarily the appropriate standard level un-
45 [d. at 58,644. 
46 [d. at 58,644-45. 
4744 Fed. Reg. 38,642 (1979). 
48 [d. at 58,648. 
49 [d. at 58,653-54. 
50 [d. at 58,650. 
51 [d. at 58,654. 
52 [d. 
53 [d. at 58,65l. 
54 [d. 
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der the Policy. However, EPA bowed to the primarily health-based 
concern of section 112 by calling for standards more stringent than 
the best available technology when necessary to eliminate unreason-
able residual risks that may be projected to remain after implemen-
tation of BAT controls. 55 
From the outset, this Policy did little or nothing to improve reg-
ulation of airborne carcinogens. EPA itself expressed doubts about 
the workability of the proposed Policy. 56 The proposal has never 
been made into a final, formal policy, and its application on the test 
case level has failed. In 1980, EPA proposed emission standards for 
benzene, in what apparently was to be a test case of the new Policy. 57 
This test failed miserably because three of the four proposed benzene 
source-category emission standards were eventually withdrawn and 
the fourth was not made final until 1984. 58 Ostensibly, their with-
drawal was based on health, rather than economic reasons, as EPA 
concluded that these sources did not present the "significant risk" 
required to trigger section 112 regulation. 59 
The only other carcinogens for which Clean Air Act standards 
have been established are radionuclides, for which final regulations 
were adopted in 1985. 60 In this case, too, the agency equivocated as 
to the appropriate degree of control, and final standards once again 
were not promulgated until well after the 180-day statutory deadline, 
and then only under court decree. 61 
In sum, EPA has accomplished very little in terms of controlling 
airborne emissions of carcinogens. Only four substances have been 
regulated, even though dozens, or even hundreds, of carcinogens 
55 Id. at 58,654. 
56 See, e.g., 11 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 810-11 (Oct. 10, 1980) (summarizing interview with 
Walter Barber). 
57 EPA had originally listed benzene under section 112 in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 29,333 (1977). 
Emission standards were proposed for four specific source-categories in late 1980 and early 
1981, as the Carter Administration was leaving office. 45 Fed. Reg. 26,660 (1980) (maleic 
anhydride plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 83,448 (1980) (ethylbenzene/styrene plants); 45 Fed. Reg. 
83,952 (1980) (benzene storage tanks) and 46 Fed. Reg. 1165 (1980) (fugitive emissions). 
58 49 Fed. Reg. 23,478 (1984). EPA withdrew standards for the first three source-categories 
because they did "not pose significant public health risks." Id. at 23,562. At this time, the 
Administrator reaffirmed the need to control fugitive emissions and proposed a new standard 
to regulate benzene emissions from coke by-product recovery plants. Id. at 23,494, 23,522. 
59Id. at 23,562. 
60 As with benzene, the first final "regulation" consisted of a withdrawal of numerous 
proposed emission controls on source-categories and a reaffirmation of regulations as applied 
to only one source-category, in this case uranium mines. 49 Fed. Reg. 43,906, 43,908, 43,912 
(1984). 
61 See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 17 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1748 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
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pollute the nation's air.62 At the current rate, over two centuries 
will pass before EPA completes regulation on only the substances 
already identified as priority candidates for control,63 without even 
considering newly discovered hazards. 
Of course, this slow pace of regulation is only a problem if carcin-
ogenic air pollutants present a significant health threat to the public. 
As industry has pointed out, many studies have failed to find a 
measurable effect of air pollution on human mortality.64 Other stud-
ies, however, attribute thousands of human deaths to air pollutants, 
especially substances that currently fall under section 112.65 While 
existing scientific studies are inconclusive, prudence would dictate 
some action, especially given the massive quantities of known cancer-
causing agents that are being emitted into the air.66 Moreover, given 
the limits of epidemiological studies, thousands of people could be 
dying from air pollution, and scientists might never be able to prove 
the link between certain air pollutants and the deaths of persons 
exposed to them. 67 It seems clear that the federal government's 
62 See CAA Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 519 (testimony of David D. Doniger of the 
Natural Resources Defense Council). EPA has pointed out that "there are 55,000 chemicals 
in commerce, many of which are or are suspected of being toxic to humans and which can be 
emitted to the atmosphere." Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 233. 
There was a brief flurry of activity in September 1985, but this consisted only of notices of 
"intent to regulate" chloroform, ethylene oxide, ethylene dichloride and cadmium. See 50 Fed. 
Reg. 39,626, 40,286, 41,994, and 42,000 (1985). No specific regulations were even proposed, 
much less adopted. 
63 EPA developed a list of 43 priority air pollutants for section 112 regulation in 1976, a list 
that has subsequently been refined to 37 and then 34. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
DELAYS IN EPA's REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS 8-13 (1983). 
64 See, e.g., CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 674-94. There, the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association submitted a summary of numerous scientific studies suggesting that there was no 
significant link between air pollution exposure and cancer. 
65 For example, a study by Clement Associates, Inc., prepared for the Natural Resources 
Defense Council estimated that over ten percent of all lung cancers in the United States are 
attributable to air pollution. See CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 533. This would represent 
10,000 to 20,000 cases per year. [d. at 695 (testimony of David Doniger of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council). A more recent EPA estimate puts the number of deaths attrib-
utable to airborne carcinogens at 2,010, with about half of these from major stationary sources 
regulable under Title I of the Clean Air Act. See 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 435 (July 20, 1984). 
66 The Court has stressed the cautionary role of public health legislation and the need to 
err on the side of safety, when the truth cannot be determined clearly. See 448 U.S. at 665. 
67 The report on cancer of the Office of Science and Technology Policy stresses that such 
epidemiological studies cannot prove the absence of a hazard but can at most provide "upper 
bounds" to the magnitude of risk. 49 Fed. Reg. 21,594, 21,643 (1984). That report also notes 
that the "epidemiological method is often hampered by the long latent period that exists 
between exposure to a carcinogenic agent and the development of cancer, by the inability to 
control for the confounding influences of unk;:town risk factors, by problems in assessing specific 
agents when the human exposures are to mixtures, by the frequent absence of appropriate 
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current policy cannot be defended by claims that regulation is un-
necessary, and even industry has not attempted to do so. 
c. Section 112 As A Source of Past Problems 
While the EPA's inability to regulate most hazardous air pollutants 
no doubt has manyexplanatiens, a root cause has been the agency's 
exclusive reliance on section 112 of the Clean Air Act as its main 
source of regulatory authority. Superficially at least, that section 
appears to call for absolute safety without any consideration of eco-
nomic effects. 68 In practice, such an objective would compel the shut-
down of important industrial sectors.69 While EPA has rejected this 
absolutist interpretation of section 112, the agency is concerned that 
a court challenge to its regulations might force them to take such an 
extreme approach. 
Indeed, ample testimony indicates that the fear of extreme, eco-
nomically catastrophic regulatory requirements is the basic reason 
for EPA's hesitance to regulate airborne carcinogens. EPA con-
cluded that the absolute safety approach is a defensible reading of 
the Act, and thus the General Accounting Office has adopted it as 
the preferred reading.70 The risk that such an interpretation might 
be judicially forced on the agency has prompted EPA to avoid full 
implementation of the section, thereby avoiding judicial review. 
One member of EPA's Pollutant Assessment Branch in the Office 
of Air Quality Planning and Standards, explained that "the Agency 
has also been reluctant to list pollutants as hazardous without some 
reasonable assurance that subsequent regulations would convey 
health benefits that are not grossly disproportionate to the costs of 
control."71 EPA's Draft Toxic Air Pollutant Strategy72 sought mod-
groups for study, and by a variety of difficulties associated with accurate and unbiased 
historical exposure assessment and disease ascertainment." [d. at 21,643-44. 
68 See supra note 30. 
69 See supra notes 31-32. 
70 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DELAYS IN EPA's REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS AIR 
POLLUTANTS, App. I (1983). While recognizing the difficulties presented by a zero risk 
approach to carcinogen regulation, the GAO nonetheless concludes that proper statutory 
interpretation requires such a result. [d. at 52-53. 
71 See Haigh, Harrison & Nichols, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Regulation: 
Case Studies of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 403 (1984) (quoting 
from a speech made by Mr. Patrick to the Air Pollution Control Association). 
72 See EPA Air Program's Draft Toxic Air Pollutant Strategy: Comments by Agency's 
Office of Policy and Resource Management, reprinted in 13 ENV'T REP. 1184 (BNA) (Novem-
ber 26, 1982). These comments stress that section 112 "lacks an explicit economic test, making 
it difficult and potentially impossible to identify 'reasonable' control requirements when dealing 
with no-threshold pollutants such as carcinogens." [d. 
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ifications in the program after noting that they were "reluctant to 
implement actions under the relatively restrictive section 112 with-
out a clear indication that the cost of control is not grossly dispro-
portionate to the health benefits. "73 A later EPA analysis stressed 
that the zero-risk interpretation "deterred the listing and promul-
gation of many regulations . . . . "74 Former EPA Administrator 
William Ruckelshaus testified before Congress that "[m]ost parties 
agree that the current statutory test is unworkable, if interpreted 
literally, and . . . this test can lead to a certain paralysis in decision-
making. "75 
The Director of EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Stan-
dards, explained the agency's failure to deal with airborne carcino-
gens: 
EPA, industry and the environmental community have all looked 
on section 112 as requiring stringent regulations on sources of 
listed pollutants. All have perceived that there is a potential for 
open-ended control requirements and the possibility of ultimately 
requiring near zero emissions regardless of costs. Given this 
potential and the apparent lack of flexibility regarding removal 
of substances from the list or exclusion of source categories from 
control requirements the Agency has been reluctant to list chem-
icals .... 76 
Of course, EPA's current interpretation of section 112 avoids this 
eventuality, but the agency has limited confidence in the strength of 
its reading if challenged during litigation. The Director candidly 
noted that the "logic" of its interpretation is "substantially strained, 
given the language of the statute."77 He conceded that he was "not 
really sure that it would pass muster if it ever got to court. "78 
73 [d. 
7' See Fourth Draft of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant Strategy, reprinted in 14 ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 1633 (January 21, 1983). 
75 Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 19. Ruckelshaus emphasized 
the need for "more flexibility" than permitted by section 112, including the authority to weigh 
"such factors as the costs of a particular control strategy." [d. EPA's experience with section 
112 exemplifies the general principle that when an agency "is compelled to regulate more 
strictly than it would prefer, it will probably become even more reluctant to undertake new 
standards." Mendeloff, Does Overregulation Cause Underregulation?, REGULATION, Sept.! 
Oct. 1981 at 49. 
76 CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 737. 
77 Hearings on Health and the Environment Miscellaneous - Part 5 Before the Subcomm. 
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. 143 (1981). 
78 [d. Others outside the agency have also recognized this difficulty. Khristine Hall of the 
Environmental Defense Fund explained the failure of the Carter Administration to act: 
"because they were struggling with this concept of having to set a standard that meant an 
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In sum, the potentially extreme language of section 112 has fright-
ened EPA away from making any significant use of that authority. 
Yet the agency has determined independently that airborne carcin-
ogens are to be regulated exclusively under section 112. The obvious 
result is that such hazardous air pollutants will be largely uncon-
trolled. Although Congress is dissatisfied with this state of affairs, 
attempts to amend the section have been fruitless. Meanwhile, the 
use of other Clean Air Act sections has largely been overlooked. As 
discussed below, the use of section 111(d) to regulate airborne car-
cinogens holds great promise, at least pending successful amend-
ments to section 112. 
III. THE NEW ApPROACH OFFERED By SECTION 111(d) 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act79 is known primarily for its 
provision for New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) to control 
emissions from newly constructed facilities. An important additional 
authority, which has been largely unused, exists in section 111(d)80 
for setting performance standards for emission controls on existing 
sources. Use of this subsection to control stationary sources of air-
borne carcinogens offers a promising alternative to section 112.81 
A. The Operation of Section 111 
Section 111(d)82 is based roughly on the new source provisions of 
section 111. Under section 111, the procedure for setting NSPSs 
begins with a decision to list a "category of stationary sources" which 
"causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may rea-
'ample margin of safety' which they were legally interpreting as measuring zero discharge 
emission." CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 729. Congressman Broyhill concluded that the 
possibility of an extreme, zero emission interpretation of Section 112 "has been the root cause 
and the resulting cause of the delay in regulation." Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, 
supra note 10, at 6. Chairman Dingell, the chairman of the committee that conducts oversight 
on EPA, vividly observed that "[t]he EPA and the SAB [Science Advisory Board] look upon 
section 112 as a red hot potato that neither wants to touch for fear that they will get burned." 
[d. at 121. 
79 See 42 U.S.C. ,§ 7411(0 (1976). 
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1976). 
81 The benefits of expanded reliance on section 111(d) are discussed generally throughout 
the remainder of this article. It is worthwhile at this point, to note that Walter Barber of 
EPA testified that more effective carcinogen regulation "could be accomplished either through 
modifications to section 112 or through the expanded use of section 111 .... " CAA Hearings, 
supra note 1, at 742. 
8242 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1976). 
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sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."83 In 
contrast to section 112, this test imposes a lower threshold of health 
effects, and focuses on sources of pollution, rather than the pollutants 
themselves. In addition, this section applies only to "significant" 
contributors to air pollution, while section 112 may be interpreted 
to apply to every source, no matter how insignificant. 84 
Once a source category has been listed under section 111, EPA 
has 120 days to publish proposed regulations, for a NSPS.85 After 
an informal proceeding, and within 90 days of the proposal, EPA 
must adopt a final NSPS, which "reflects the degree of emission 
reduction achievable through the application of the best system of 
continuous emission reduction which (taking into consideration the 
cost of such emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and 
environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator 
determines has been adequately demonstrated. "86 In sharp contrast 
to section 112, this authority requires that the standard be achiev-
able and that "costs" and other adverse impacts be considered. 87 
The vast majority of NSPSs adopted by EPA involve criteria 
pollutants, or the precursors of such pollutants, whose ambient levels 
are controlled under sections 108-110 of the Act.88 Since ambient 
levels from existing plants are already controlled by the states under 
section 110, the authority in section 111 for criteria pollutants is 
limited to new sources. 89 Congress also contemplated, however, that 
NSPSs might need to be established for non-criteria pollutants as 
well. Accordingly, the legislature provided a mechanism in section 
111(d) to ensure that existing sources of these pollutants could be 
controlled. 
Section 111(d) extends to designated pollutants, that is, pollutants 
" ... for which air quality standards have not been issued or which 
are not included on a list under section 108(a) or 112(b)(I)(A),"90 but 
83 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (1976). 
84 Mr. Barber has expressed concern that the Clean Air Act might be interpreted to require 
EPA to regulate every source of a pollutant listed as hazardous. See CAA Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 745. While EPA has not historically controlled every source of such pollutants, 
nothing in the Act expressly authorizes such exceptions. 
85 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
86 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(C) (1976). 
fnld. 
88 Criteria pollutants are those which Congress mandated that EPA regulate under sections 
108-110. See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1984). 
89 By its terms, section l11(d) excludes all pollutants listed under sections 108 or 112. 42 
U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i) (1976). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A) (1976). 
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to which an NSPS would apply if the existing source in question 
"were a new source."91 Section 111(d) requires EPA to "prescribe 
regulations" establishing a procedure "under which each state shall 
submit to the Administrator a plan which . . . provides for the 
implementation and enforcement" of emission standards applicable 
to existing sources of designated pollutants subject to NSPSs.92 
Unlike section 112, therefore, the states must play an integral role 
in order effectively to implement section 111(d).93 EPA has consid-
erable authority over state implementation, and has existing, but 
largely unused, regulations setting forth a detailed procedure for 
carrying out section 111(d).94 Once an NSPS is promulgated for a 
category of sources of a "designated pollutant," EPA publishes a 
notice in the Federal Register of the availability of a "draft guideline 
document"95 containing, inter alia, (i) "[a]n emission guideline that 
reflects the application of the best system of emission reduction 
(considering the cost of such reduction) that has been adequately 
demonstrated,"96 and (ii) "the time within which compliance with 
emission standards of equivalent stringency can be achieved. "97 The 
"emission guidelines" and "compliance times" formally "will be pro-
posed for comment" in the same Federal Register notice, and "will 
be promulgated" as final regulations at the same time that a final 
guideline document is made available. 98 
Within nine months of the date on which the emission guidelines 
and compliance deadlines are promulgated, the states are required 
to "adopt and submit to [EPA] . . . a plan for the control of the 
designated pollutant. "99 These section 111(d) plans must include 
emission standards and compliance schedules "no less stringent" than 
those promulgated by EPA,1°O except that a state may adopt less 
91 [d. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(I)(A) (1976). 
93 Section 112 is unique among the provisions in Title I of the Clean Air Act because it 
establishes a system of strictly federal emission standards. Section 111(d), however, is more 
consistent with the overall program of state involvement. Congress clearly intended to grant 
the states a central role in determining how standards are to be achieved. Section 101 of the 
Act declares unequivocally that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is 
the primary responsibility of States and local governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1976 and 
Supp. V 1981). EPA is now seeking to expand the state role under section 112 to regulate 
problems presented by a relatively small number of sources. 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 235 (June 
7, 1985) . 
.. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.20-34 (1985). 
96 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(a) (1985). 
96 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(b)(5) (1985). 
97 [d. 
98 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(c) (1985). 
99 40 C.F.R. § 60.23(a)(1) (1985). 
100 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(c) (1985). 
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stringent requirements "[o]n a case-by-case basis for particular des-
ignated facilities or classes of facilities," if the state shows: 
(1) [u]nreasonable cost of control resulting from plant age, location, 
or basic process design; 
(2) [p]hysical impossibility of installing necessary control equip-
ment; or 
(3) [o]ther factors specific to the facility (or class of facilities) that 
make application of a less stringent standard or final compliance 
time significantly more reasonable. 101 
These state plans under section 111(d) must meet other requirements 
as well, designed to ensure that standards have full legal effect, are 
enforceable, and will be monitored effectively. 102 EPA has four 
months after receipt of a state plan to "propose the plan . . . for 
approval or disapproval," and to reach a final decision. l03 
Section 111 obviously differs from section 112 in several important 
respects, particularly in that it authorizes the agency and the states 
to consider costs in promulgating regulations and compliance plans. 
These differences make section 111 more effective for regulation of 
airborne carcinogens, and, as shown below, EPA's use of this section 
offers several important advantages over the current policy. 
B. Benefits of Increased Reliance on Section 111(d) 
Since the existing regulatory approach to airborne carcinogens has 
failed, a change in policy is imperative. As discussed above, the 
EPA's exclusive reliance upon section 112 has made it an inadequate 
regulator of airborne carcinogens, indicating that the EPA's first 
change should be to utilize other statutory means available under 
the Clean Air Act. As the following subsections discuss, the use of 
section 111(d) as a regulatory alternative will better conform to 
congressional intent under the Clean Air Act, will promote more 
cost-effective regulation, and will enable EPA to focus its resources 
on the localized problems that present the greatest hazard from 
carcinogenic air pollutants. 
1. Conformity to Congressional Intent 
The EPA's expanded reliance on section 111(d) for controlling 
airborne carcinogens would better reflect the intent of Congress in 
passing and amending the Clean Air Act. The legislative history 
101 40 C.F.R. § 60.24(f) (1985). 
102 See 40 C.F.R. § 60.24.26 (1985). 
103 40 C.F.R. § 60.27(b) (1985). 
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indicates that Congress did not intend EPA to rely entirely on any 
one section of the Act, but rather contemplated that the agency 
would consider all its alternatives before acting. 
Examination of the structure of the Clean Air Act reveals that 
Congress was particularly farsighted in its understanding of some 
air pollution problems. Title I of the Actl04 as passed in 1970, ad-
dressed stationary sources, and provided EPA several regulatory 
alternatives by establishing a tripartite framework for emissions 
regulation. Congress created three provisions: (i) National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards under sections 108-110;105 (ii) performance 
standards for new and existing facilities under section 111;106 and 
(iii) NESHAPs under section 112.107 
Each of these three types of authority was intended to playa role 
under the 1970 Act. Drawing on "[kJnowledge and experience gained 
under the Air Quality Act of 1967,"108 Congress observed that for 
regulatory purposes "pollution agents and combination of such 
agents fall into three general categories. "109 The first of these cate-
gories was described as "those pollution agents which are emitted 
from diverse stationary and moving sources into the ambient air and 
which are generally detectable through monitoring devices. "110 Sec-
tions 108-110 were enacted to control such ubiquitous pollutants. As 
guidance, Congress listed a number of pollutants that it regarded as 
candidates for control under these sections, including those sub-
stances addressed under the 1967 Air Quality Act, as well as lead 
and other pollutants commonly found in the ambient air throughout 
the country.111 The second category was defined as especially haz-
ardous substances, to be controlled through section 112.112 The final 
category was to cover all remaining pollutants, including those that 
are not "widely present . . . in the ambient air," or that for other 
reasons fail to meet the narrow criteria of the first two categories. 113 
Congress enacted section 111, in part, to control this third category 
of pollutants. 
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7508 (1978). 
105 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (1978). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1978). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1978). 
108 1970 Leg. Hist., supra note 23, at 418. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
111 For a discussion of the strength of congressional intent that these substances be regulated 
under section 108, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 326-
27 (2d Cir. 1976) (compelling EPA to regulate lead under section 108). 
112 1970 Leg. Hist., supra note 23, at 418. 
113 [d. 
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Section 111(d) specifically was intended as a "gap-filling"114 mea-
sure for "pollutants which cannot be controlled through the ambient 
air quality standards and which are not hazardous substances. "115 
For example, Congress contemplated that section 111(d) would be 
used for those pollutants that "are not emitted in such quantities or 
are not of such a character as to be widely present. . . in the ambient 
air."116 Similarly, Congress intended section 111(d) to be used for 
emissions of pollutants that are "generally confined ... to the area 
of the emission source,"117 that is, "less diverse and widespread 
pollutants,"118 whose danger to public health was relatively localized 
in nature. 
This legislative history indicates that the choice between EPA's 
three sources of authority under the Act should not turn on the 
potential hazard of a substance, but should be based on the actual 
nature of the risk to the public presented. While carcinogens are 
obviously "hazardous" in one sense of the word, the degree of hazard 
will depend on the potency of the individual substance and, espe-
cially, the pattern of public exposure to it. 119 Thus, the Senate Report 
recognized that some known carcinogens, including radioactive sub-
stances and pesticides, could appropriately be regulated under sec-
tion 111(d), and not necessarily under section 112.120 EPA's own 
review of the legislative history concludes that Congress decided to 
regulate some such pollutants under section 111(d) because, "given 
the relative lack of information on their health and welfare effects, 
. . . [a] technology-based approach (making allowances for the cost 
of controlling existing sources) was a reasonable means of attacking 
the problem until more definitive information became known. "121 
114Id. at 227 (statement of Sen. Muskie). Sen. Muskie's comment related to section 114 of 
the Senate bill under consideration, which was the precursor of section 111(d). Compare 1970 
Leg. Hist. at 656-61 (language of then-section 114) with 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1976). 
115Id. 
116 1970 Leg. Hist., supra note 23, at 418. 
ll7 Id. 
118 Id. at 260 (statement of Sen. Cooper). Congress did not intend that use of section 111(d) 
be limited to such localized hazards, however. Section 111 was presented as an option for any 
pollutants "which cannot be considered hazardous (as defined in section [112])." Id. at 420 
(Senate Report). 
119 EPA's most recent proposed guidelines for carcinogen risk ,assessment call for an analysis 
of these two factors. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,294, 46,299 (1984). The relative potency of carcinogens 
may vary by a factor of millions among substances, and the extent of exposure may vary by 
as much as one billion times. See Gori, The Regulation of Carcinogenic Hazards, in RISK IN 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 171 (C. Hohenemser & J.X. Kasperson eds. 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as RISK IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY]; Coun~il Report, 246 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 
253,254 (July 17, 1981). 
120 See 1970 Leg. Hist., supra note 23, at 418 (Senate Report). 
121 40 Fed. Reg. at 53,342 (1975). 
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The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977122 carried forward the 
system established in 1970 and reaffirmed Congress' intent that 
section 111 be utilized as an alternative for controlling potential 
airborne carcinogens. At that time, testimony that certain carcino-
genic air pollutants (including cadmium, arsenic, polycyclic organic 
matter and radioactive pollutants) posed a threat to public health123 
prompted Congress to direct EPA to "review all available relevant 
information,"l24 and determine whether and to what degree their 
emissions should be regulated. Recognizing that it lacked the sci-
entific information necessary to make definitive judgments about the 
degree and type of hazard presented by each of these substances, 
Congress chose not to "specify the degree of emission reduction that 
should be required. "125 Rather, Congress provided that if the Ad-
ministrator made the "affirmative judgment" that any of these po-
tential pollutants required control under the Clean Air Act, then 
"the Administrator should apply the appropriate means and extent 
of regulation under the existing statutory criteria - that is, ambient 
standards (sections 109 and 110), new and existing source perfor-
mance standards (section 111), and hazardous emission standards 
(section 112). "126 
In sum, Congress intended EPA to evaluate its possible control 
authorities and select the section best suited to regulation of a given 
substance. EPA's unwavering reliance on section 112 for airborne 
carcinogens has strayed from this plan and incidentally undermined 
the effectiveness of the Act. 
Before advocating a grant to EPA of limitless discretion in eval-
uating control alternatives, however, it is important to address the 
decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 127 
which overturned an EPA decision not to list lead for control under 
section 108. Lead had not been listed because the agency preferred 
to rely on section 211 of the Act which addressed mobile sources of 
lead. In this decision, the Second Circuit held that "the Administra-
tor must list those pollutants which he has determined meet the two 
requisites set forth in section 108. "128 
122 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1978)). 
123 Congress found that "each of the four pollutants has been found to be cancer-causing or 
cancer-promoting in laboratory animal experiments and in human beings in occupational 
settings." A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6572 (1979) (House Report) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Leg. Hist.J. 
124 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1978). 
125 1977 Leg. Hist., supra note 123, at 6576 (House Report). 
126 Id. 
127 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976). 
128 Id. at 325. 
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For a variety of reasons, this decision should not significantly 
restrict EPA's discretion to choose among Title I's authorities for 
stationary source regulation of emissions of airborne carcinogens. 
First, the court relied heavily on numerous statements in the Clean 
Air Act's legislative history that expressed congressional intent that 
EPA regulate lead under section 108. 129 As we have seen for carcin-
ogens, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended the 
various alternatives to be considered. 130 
Second, Natural Resources Defense Council involved an EPA 
choice not to regulate stationary sources under Title I because it 
planned to control mobile sources under Title II of the Clean Air 
Act. The court rejected this choice, finding that the provisions of 
section 211 were intended to serve "as a supplement to [sections] 
108-110 ... rather than as an alternative to promulgation of stan-
dards."131 By contrast, the provisions of sections 108, l11(d), and 112 
are by their terms mutually exclusive alternatives for regulating 
stationary sources. 132 Indeed, the lead decision itself implies that 
EPA has ample discretion to choose among different "emission con-
trol" provisions of the Act, for example, to choose between sections 
111 and 112.133 
A final key distinction between the EPA's lead decision and the 
situation under consideration in Natural Resources Defense Council 
was explained by the lower court's decision. That opinion stressed 
that "the Administrator has considerable, and sufficient, discretion" 
to "exercise his judgment over the initial determination of whether 
a pollutant" meets the listing criteria of a specific section. 134 In the 
lead case, the Administrator conceded that lead met the criteria for 
section 108 listing. 135 By contrast, the proposed policy for airborne 
carcinogens employs just this discretion to make the initial decision 
of under which section to list a substance. 136 If anything , Natural 
129 [d. at 326-27. 
130 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
131 545 F.2d at 325. 
132 While the provisions of section 111(b) dealing with new source performance standards 
are clearly intended to supplement section 108 ambient standards, the provisions of section 
111(d) expressly present an alternative to that section and section 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) 
(1976). 
133 545 F.2d at 327. 
134 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 411 F.Supp. 864, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
135 [d. 
136 The language of the Clean Air Act itself also supports a broad discretion for the Admin-
istrator in listing decisions. Section 112 listing is limited to those substances "for which [the 
Administrator] intends to establish an emission standard." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1976). 
Section 122 of the Act as amended in 1977 also illustrates this authority, by calling upon the 
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Resources Defense Council supports this exercise of discretion. 137 
In short, consideration of section 111(d) as an alternative to section 
112 is supported by the legislative history of the Clean Air Act. As 
discussed below, such a return to congressional intent would also 
further the effectiveness of airborne carcinogen regulation by tar-
geting regulation to sources that most need it, while minimizing 
possible adverse economic effects. 
2. Focus on Localized Hazards 
For many airborne carcinogens, human exposure is limited to a 
small area surrounding the emitting sources. Thus, EPA officials 
have noted that "[a]mbient exposures to non-criteria pollutants are 
localized," and that concentrations "drop off rapidly within a few 
miles. "138 Naturally, the hazard to the public will correspond to these 
exposure levels. 139 
As noted above, the health evidence on airborne carcinogens is 
controversial and inconclusive. There is a widespread belief, how-
ever, that such risks are predominantly local. The former EPA As-
sistant Administrator for Air and Radiation has observed that there 
is little ambient average risk but that there are "relatively higher 
risks to a small number of individuals in the immediate vicinity of 
large sources."140 EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus testified before 
Congress that "if there are serious air toxics problems in this coun-
try, they are localized problems. "141 
These conclusions are confirmed by expert scientific evidence. 
Doctors Doll and Peto of Oxford University, who are among the 
world's foremost epidemiologists, reviewed the available epidemio-
logical studies and concluded that the current and future risk from 
Administrator to study certain substances and regulate them if necessary "under section 108 
... or section 112 ... or ... under section 111." 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1976). 
The legislative history of the Act lends further support to this reading. Congress intended 
that listing a substance under the predecessor of 111(d), section 114 of the Senate bill, "be 
left to the discretion" of the Administrator. 1977 Leg. Hist., supra note 123, at 418 (Senate 
Report). Similar language reflects this intent regarding section 112's predecessor in the Senate 
bill. Id. at 420. 
137 Further support may be found in the First Circuit's decision in South Terminal Corp. v. 
EPA, 504 F.2d .646 (1st Cir. 1974). In the context of section 110 state implementation plan 
approval authority, the First Circuit emphasized that "Congress lodged with the EPA, not 
the courts, the discretion to choose among alternative strategies." I d. at 655. 
138 CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 735 (statement of Walter Barber). 
139 See id. at 740 (Mr. Barber notes that the "health and exposure assessments completed 
to date ... suggest little or no risk of acute effects at ambient levels" of airborne carcinogens. 
"They do indicate relatively higher risks to a small number of individuals."). 
14°Id. 
141 Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 19. 
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average exposures to airborne carcinogens "should be minute," but 
they stressed that "there may be exceptions where the atmosphere 
around a particular factory is abnormally contaminated. "142 
The localized nature of the threat from airborne carcinogens is 
aptly illustrated by EPA's experience, specifically, the failed attempt 
to set NESHAPs for benzene emissions from maleic anhydride 
plants. 143 While EPA sought to set a national standard, the agency's 
data showed that most of the projected risk resulted from one single 
plant near St. Louis. 144 This is a classic example of a localized public 
health problem. 
In these instances, Congress clearly intended EPA to use section 
111(d) to control emissions of air pollutants. 145 Such an approach 
should lead to a more effective system of control. EPA's regulatory 
resources are limited, as are society's resources for compliance. 146 If 
a problem is purely local, it is a waste of these finite resources to 
regulate nationally. Such inefficient use of resources can only lead 
to a lower level of overall control on airborne carcinogens. 147 In 
contrast, setting standards appropriate to a specific situation enables 
EPA to focus its resources and to establish the controls most appro-
priate to the hazard in question. 
Former Administrator Ruckelshaus summed up the problem with 
EPA's exclusive reliance on section 112 for localized risks. He ex-
pressed his concern with "the possibility that in some localities with 
142 Doll and Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of 
Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 1191, 1246 (June 1981). See 
also Hammond and Garfinkel, General Air Pollution and Cancer in the United States, 9 
PREVo MED. 206 (1980). 
143 This emission standard, proposed in late 1980, was withdrawn in July 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 
23,478 (1984). 
144 At the time of withdrawal, there were only seven maleic anhydride plants in existence, 
and only one had uncontrolled emissions that would have been controlled by the proposed 
standard. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,492 (1984). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8389 (1984) (proposed 
withdrawal notice discussing the risk from specific maleic anhydride operations). 
145 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., Merrill, Federal Regu,Zation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, Draft Report to 
the Administrative Conference of the United States (April 1, 1982), Part II, at 27 ("Resource 
constraints also limit the selection of chemicals for regulation. No agency has been able to 
regulate more than two or three controversial chemicals in any year."). 
147 See, e.g., Okrent, in RISK IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, supra note 119, at 212 ("if 
we are spending the available resources in a way that is not cost-effective, we are, in effect, 
killing people whose premature deaths could be prevented."); U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM'N., AN ApPROACH TO QUANTITATIVE SAFETY GOALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
35 (1980) ("[elxtreme reductions in a particular risk may lead to increases in other, less well-
studied risks."); CAA Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 12, at 20 (testimony of William 
Ruckelshaus) ("it appears that the limited resources used to set NESHAPs may be employed 
elsewhere to achieve greater public health protection."). 
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unusually high concentrations of airborne toxics there live numbers 
of people exposed to unacceptably high risks. "148 Ruckelshaus was 
even more concerned that "if our hazardous air pollutant control 
program consists of nothing but setting national emissions standards 
for industrial sources of such pollutants, we may not be obtaining a 
great deal of public health protection. "149 His statement recognizes 
that national emission standards may not take account of unusually 
high, local concentrations of particular pollutants. 
As discussed above, EPA has an alternative authority in section 
111(d) that was specifically designed to address localized threats. 
Expanded use of this authority should promote more comprehensive 
and effective emissions controls, and thus fill a gap in public health 
protection that section 112 does not adequately address. 
3. Cost-Effective Regulation 
Perhaps the most significant benefit EPA might gain by relying 
on section 111(d) is an ability to consider costs when framing regu-
latory requirements. Of course, environmental groups and other 
concerned parties object to any such cost considerations when the 
public health is at issue. 150 Experience under section 112, however, 
demonstrates that agency decision makers become paralyzed when 
they are unable to take into consideration compliance costS. 151 Con-
sideration of costs may be imperfect, but it is certainly an improve-
ment over the current system that encourages inaction. 
It should be emphasized that the cost considerations in section 
111(d) are not of the cost-benefit analysis type. The section does not 
call for any elaborate equation that balances intangible benefits with 
tangible costS. 152 Such analysis has been the subject of trenchant 
criticism and appears inappropriate to Clean Air Act regulation. 153 
148 Air Pollution Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 16. 
149Id. 
150 For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council has opposed a proposed amendment 
offered by Rep. John Dingell, in part because his proposal "would require EPA to justify a 
control measure's cost by showing that health benefits are worth the expense .... " 15 ENV'T 
REP. (BNA) 36 (May 11, 1984). 
151 See supra notes 8-17 and 33-78 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 154-57. 
153 See, e.g., Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and 
Environmental Decisionmaking, 8 EcoL. L.Q. 473 (1980) and sources cited therein. Mr. 
Baram ultimately affirms the importance of some cost considerations, however, due to gov-
ernment's "responsibility to manage the federal enterprise rationally in order to achieve 
optimal use of our limited resources and optimal protection of our diverse interests." Id. at 
531. 
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Instead, section 111 incorporates a "technology-based" approach 
that requires EPA to promulgate "achievable" requirements based 
on "consideration" of "costS."I54 As interpreted, the section simply 
requires the costs be "reasonable."155 The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals has directed EPA to adopt the standard under section 111 
"which can reasonably be expected to serve the interests of pollution 
control without becoming exorbitantly costly. "156 Thus, rather than 
an elaborate cost-benefit analysis that may be subject to endless 
challenges, section 111 imposes a "common sense" approach to gaug-
ing the cost-effectiveness of emissions standards. 157 
Cost-effective regulation will be more protective of public health 
than purely health-based standards. The latter will divert scarce 
resources to hazards that may be insignificant. 158 As we have seen, 
the mere prospect of totally health-based controls is sufficiently 
frightening to forestall much needed regulation. 159 The use of a cost-
effectiveness consideration removes the basic cause of this fear. 
Not surprisingly, there is a growing recognition of the benefits of 
a cost-effectiveness requirement, and even environmental organi-
zations have recognized the value of setting technology-based stan-
dards for airborne carcinogens. 160 EPA is more likely to act under 
such authority, as experience with NSPSs under section 111 amply 
demonstrates. While controversies have arisen under section 111, as 
under any other environmental regulatory program, the agency has 
been much more effective in developing NSPSs than in promulgating 
NESHAPs under section 112.161 
154 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(I)(C) (1976). 
155 Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
417 U.S. 921 (1974). This decision specifically rejected a cost-benefit analysis requirement 
sought by petitioner. [d. 
156 Essex Chern. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 969 (1974). 
157 Even proponents of cost-benefit analysis often defend this sort of loose evaluation of 
costs without rigid mechanistic monetization of all factors. See, e.g., Hearings on Executive 
Branch Review of Environmental Regulations Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pol-
lution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 
(1979) (statement of Charles Schultze, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers). 
See also Hurter, Tolley & Fabian, Benefit-Cost Analysis and the Common Sense of Environ-
mental Policy, in CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 87-106 
(Swartzman, Liroff & Croke eds. 1982). 
156 See supra note 157. 
159 See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., CAA Hearings, supra note 1, at 715 (statement of Khristine Hall of Environ-
mental Defense Fund) (offering to accept technology-based standards for carcinogens provided 
that additional regulation is the result); 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 376 (June 29, 1984) (Sierra 
Club supports technology-based standards for hazardous air pollutants). 
161 A glance at the Code of Federal Regulations proves this point. In contrast to the dearth 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Tragically, thousands of Americans are exposed to a substantial 
risk of death from cancer, while EPA wrangles with industry and 
environmental groups over both the proper interpretation of section 
112 of the Clean Air Act, and the question of whether that section 
should be amended. 162 Although EPA acknowledges the unaccepta-
bility of this situation, the agency has done nothing to resolve it. 
While Congress intermittently holds hearings to criticize the agency 
for its failures, it too has failed to remedy the situation. 
EPA possesses the authority in section 111 of the Act to initiate 
prompt steps to reduce the emissions of carcinogens into the ambient 
air. Use of this power offers promise to break the current stalemate 
in carcinogen regulation. The unique characteristics of carcinogens 
may merit their own specific control authority under an amended 
Clean Air Act. Pending the adoption of such amendments, however, 
EPA should employ the tools it has, even if they are imperfect ones, 
to limit risks as much as reasonably possible. Public health demands 
action now, rather than continued debate. 
of regulation under section 112, EPA has regulated over forty major source-categories under 
section 111. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1984). Walter Barber of EPA favorably contrasted 
the authority of section 111 to that of section 112, noting that the "new source performance 
standard program in general has been workable .... We can usually come to a reasoned 
agreement about the kinds of technology that are effective for industrial categories, and what 
are reasonable costs to impose on a new industry." Hearings on Health and the Environment 
Miscellaneous, supra note 77, at 142. 
162 A Congressional Research Service Report summarized this situation: "EPA's continued 
debate of these and related issues is widely seen as creating further delay and contention 
about whether the health-protective goals of section 112 are being achieved." Air Pollution 
Control Program Hearings, supra note 13, at 135. 
